Painting ... (is) a form of magic designed as a mediator between this strange, hostile world and us, a way of seizing the power by giving form to our terrors as well as our desires.
--Pablo Picasso

The best lawyers are very much like painters. Oratory, briefs, and agreements are the canvas, palette, and brush they use to make the things we fear less frightening and the things we aspire to more attainable.
--C. Dewees Berry, IV

ARTICLE BY EDITOR: Avoiding Lease-Drafting Pitfalls


When drafting a lease in Tennessee, a lawyer must be especially careful to adequately address repairs, destruction, reentry, holding over, assignment and subletting, forfeiture, condemnation awards, and payment of rent. If he does not, common law rules may deprive his client of anticipated rights and saddle him with unexpected burdens.

Repairs

The Tennessee Supreme Court held in Boyd v. McCarty1 that a landlord generally need not repair the demised premises unless the lease requires him to do so.2 In Boyd a landlord sued his tenant for unpaid rent on a lot and dilapidated house used for a greenhouse business. The tenant claimed an offset because bricks fell from the house, broke glass in the greenhouse, and exposed plants and flowers to cold weather. The lease did not require the landlord to keep the house in repair, however. In addition, the supreme court found that the landlord had neither deceived the tenant about the house's condition, nor was there an expressed or implied warranty that the premises were fit for greenhouse purposes. 3 The court held, therefore, that the landlord was not obligated to repair the house and the tenant was not entitled to an offset. 4

The Boyd rule has four exceptions. The Boyd court recognized two exceptions by stating that even if a lease fails to require a landlord to make repairs, he must do so if he defrauds the tenant into believing the leased premises are in good repair or warrants they are fit for the purposes for which they were rented. 5

A third exception arose in Woods v. Forest Hill Cemetery, Inc.6 In Woods, a tenant in a building occupied by several lessees fell and was injured when a bannister on a common stairway broke. The tenant sued for damages and the trial judge directed a verdict for the landlord. 7 Although the lease did not require the landlord to make repairs, the supreme court remanded the case for a new trial and held that a landlord has a duty to keep common stairs and passageways in good repair, even if he is not bound by contract to do so, when premises are rented to several lessees. 8

A final exception to the Boyd rule exists when a lease is subject to the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (the "RLTA"). 9 The RLTA applies to residential tenancies in counties having a population of 200,000 or more.10 The counties now subject to the RLTA are Shelby, Davidson, Knox, and Hamilton. In these counties the RLTA requires a landlord to make repairs to residential real property even if the lease does not impose repair obligations on the landlord. 11

A tenant not protected by an exception to the Boyd rule often assumes that his landlord must make repairs even though he does not so covenant in the lease. For example, an apartment tenant in a town not covered by the RLTA probably expects his landlord to fix a clogged sink, a broken window, or a creaking floor board. But the tenant's expectations may be thwarted unless his lawyer ensures that the lease contains a clause such as this:

The landlord will keep the leased premises in good repair.

A lease will commonly require the tenant to make interior repairs. Such a tenant may think that, by implication, his landlord must make exterior, structural and utility system repairs. If an exception to the Boyd rule is not applicable, however, the landlord need not do so unless the tenant's lawyer insists on a clause similar to this:

 The landlord will keep in good repair and working order the roof, outside walls, sprinkler system, heating, ventilating and air conditioning system, electrical system, parking area, and all underground water and sewer pipes.

When the tenant is to make repairs, his lawyer should be sure that the lease addresses whether the tenant will make those repairs if they are required because of a fire or other casualty. Unless the tenant agrees expressly to repair fire, flood, wind, or earthquake damage he probably expects the landlord to do so. Zuccarello v. Cliftonl2 held, however, that, under an unconditional covenant to repair, a lessee's liability is not limited to ordinary and gradual decay, but extends to injury or even total destruction caused by fire or other casualty.13 T.C.A. § 66-7-102 (1982) eases the Zucarelto rule by providing that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a tenant's covenant to repair does not require him to rebuild or repair a building rendered untenantable by fire or other casualty if the damage is not caused by the tenant's fault or neglect. A casualty loss is often the tenant's fault, however, and thus he should not rely completely on this statute. 14  If the tenant is to make certain repairs, except when necessitated by fire or other casualty, his lawyer should insist upon the following clause:

If the leased premises are damaged by fire or other casualty, the landlord will repair the damage.

A landlord can also be hurt by the absence of a repair clause. The common law only requires a tenant to repair damage caused by his negligence or misconduct.15 Although some authorities hold further that a tenant must prevent dilapidation of the leased premises,16 a tenant's duty to repair falls far short of that necessary to repair normal everyday wear and tear.  Moreover, the RLTA essentially provides that the tenant must only meet his common law repair obligations.17 Yet a landlord often wants and expects the tenant to do more. If he does, the lease should state specifically what repairs the tenant is to make. If the tenant is to make interior repairs, the following clause would be appropriate:

The tenant will keep the inside of the leased premises, including, without limitation, inside walls, floors, ceilings, and light fixtures, in good repair.

Destruction

When only part of a building (such as an apartment, room or space) is leased, destruction of the leased premises by fire or other cause terminates the lease. As a general rule, however, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, when a tenant leases an entire building, destruction of the premises does not terminate the lease or excuse the tenant from his rent obligations. The reason for the application of the seemingly harsh rule in the case of the lease of an entire structure is that the tenant retains an interest in and control over the land on which the building was situated after the destruction. The tenant retains no such interest or control when leasing only part of a building. 18

Greene v. Donnell19 illustrates the application of the destruction rules. In Greene, the tenant rented all of a building except a small attached shed which the landlord reserved for one year. The premises were destroyed totally by fire. After the casualty, the tenant stopped paying rent and the landlord sued. The lease did not permit the tenant to terminate the lease if the premises were destroyed. The court of appeals held that the portion of the building reserved by the landlord was so small that the tenant must be deemed to lease not just a space but the entire structure, and that therefore, the fire did not terminate the lease and the tenant was liable for rent accruing after the casualty. 20

Despite the general rule, a tenant leasing an entire building often believes he will be able to walk away if the building is destroyed. Indeed, under some circumstances the Tennessee legislature has given tenants relief from the rule of Greene v. Donnell. T.C.A. § 66-7-102 provides that, in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary, a tenant may terminate the lease upon destruction of the leased premises if the destruction was not due to his fault or neglect. Because fire damage can often be traced to the fault or neglect of the tenant, however, section 66-7-102 does not offer complete protection from the common law rule.

The RLTA offers residential tenants in Shelby, Davidson, Knox, and Hamilton Counties more substantial assistance than section 66-7-102. The RLTA allows a tenant to terminate his lease upon destruction of the leased premises regardless of whether the lease gives him this right and regardless of whether the destruction is due to his fault or neglect.21

Absent application of the RLTA, in order to avoid the automatic application of the common law rule when the structure is destroyed because of the tenant's fault or neglect, the lawyer of a tenant leasing an entire building should include a provision like this one in the lease:

If the leased premises are rendered untenantable by fire or other casualty, the tenant may terminate this lease upon giving notice to the landlord within 10 days after the casualty occurs.

Re-entry

In Brown for Lawson's Use v. Kite, 22 a farmland tenant whose rent was not due until the end of the seven-year lease term abandoned the leased premises and the landlord entered to cultivate. The supreme court held that the landlord should not have done so and that the tenant was entitled to sue for any damages he sustained because of the re-entry. 23 While the RLTA gives a landlord the statutory rights to re-enter to inspect and repair, and to regain possession after the tenant's default, 24 a landlord of premises that are not subject to the RLTA has no right to re-enter the leased premises during the term unless the lease permits him to do so. 25 He cannot, therefore, inspect his property, make repairs, or show the leased premises to prospective purchasers or tenants unless there is an appropriate provision in the lease. Accordingly, because a landlord wants and needs all of these rights, his lawyer should include a clause such as this in the lease:

The landlord may at reasonable times and on reasonable notice to the tenant enter the leased premises to inspect them, to show them to prospective purchasers, and to make any repairs required to be made by the landlord or required to be made by the tenant that the tenant has failed to make. During the 90 days before the expiration of this lease, the landlord may at reasonable times and on reasonable notice to the tenant show the leased premises to prospective tenants.

Failure to provide for re-entry if the tenant does not pay his rent or perform his other obligations will deprive a landlord of rights he probably takes for granted. Unless the lease permits him to re-enter, the landlord cannot evict a defaulting tenant and regain possession until the lease term has expired.26 The ability to secure and rerent the leased premises is usually of great importance to the landlord because a judgment for

"Failure to provide for re-entry if the tenant does not pay his rent or perform is other obligations will deprive a landlord of rights he probably takes for granted."

rent or damages against a defaulting tenant will often be uncollectible. Such a judgment may be the only relief available to the landlord, however, unless his lawyer includes a clause like this one in the lease:

In the event of any default by the tenant the landlord may re-enter the leased premises and put out the tenant or any other person occupying the leased premises and remove all personal property therefrom.

Holding Over

In Shepherd & Mitchell v. Cummings,27 a tenant leased premises from January 1 until the next December 31, but continued in possession for twenty-three days after the term had expired.28 The landlord sued for another year's rent. In holding for the landlord, the supreme court ruled that where a lease is for a year or more, the landlord may elect to treat the tenant who holds over as a tenant from year to year. 29  The court noted further that where the tenant rents for a period of less than a year and holds over, the landlord may elect to treat him as a tenant for a term equal to the term of the original contract. A tenant, therefore, must leave promptly upon the expiration of his lease or risk having to pay rent for a much longer term than he anticipated.

The Shepherd rule can also cause problems for the landlord. The court of appeals held in Smith v. Holt30 that once the landlord accepts rent, he thereby elects to continue the term, and cannot change his mind and terminate the hold over tenancy before its scheduled expiration date without the tenant's consent. Although the initial election to create the holdover tenancy is the landlord's, his election binds both parties. 31

Neither a tenant nor a landlord would knowingly agree to be bound by the Shepherd rule. Thus, if the lease is for longer than one month, the parties' lawyers should agree on a provision similar to this:

If the tenant holds over at the end of the term hereby created with the landlord's consent, the tenant shall become a tenant from month to month at the rental payable hereunder and otherwise upon the covenants and conditions contained herein.

Assignment and Subletting

The supreme court has established in Stone v. Martin 32 and Woods v. Forest Hill Cemetery, Inc. 33 that clauses against assignment and subletting are construed strictly in Tennessee and that in the absence of a restriction in the lease, a tenant may do both. Moreover, since the law favors free alienability of interests in land, any loophole in an assignment and subletting clause will be construed in the tenant's favor. For example, a prohibition against subletting will not preclude the tenant from assigning the lease, and a prohibition against assignment will not preclude the tenant from subletting the premises or encumbering his leasehold interest. 34 Similarly, a prohibition against "assignment," without more, is generally held to forbid neither an assignment by operation of law (such as to an executor or devisee upon the tenant's death), nor the effective change in the identity of a

"Neither a tenant nor a landlord would knowingly agree to be bound by the Shepherd rule."

corporate or partnership tenant by the transfer of its stock ownership or partnership interests.35 In addition, a clause such as "the tenant may not assign this lease or sublet the leased premises" will prevent the tenant from assigning his entire interest or subletting the entire premises but will not prevent a partial assignment or subletting.36 Finally, without an appropriate provision in the lease, a landlord's consent to one assignment or subletting may be deemed to be a complete waiver of the restriction thereafter. 37

A landlord usually wants control over who occupies his property and would be surprised to find that he does not have that control if the lease does not give it to him. Accordingly, a landlord's lawyer should be sure the lease contains a clause like this one:

The tenant may not assign or encumber this lease or sublet the leased premises, either in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of the landlord. Consent to one assignment or subletting will not be deemed a consent to any other. The transfer of the majority of the voting stock of the tenant if the tenant is a corporation, the transfer of a majority of the partnership interests in the tenant if the tenant is a partnership, and any transfer by operation of law will be deemed "assignments" requiring the landlord's consent.

Tenants often request that assignment and subletting provisions provide that the landlord's consent will not be withheld unreasonably. Although landlords' lawyers often readily agree to this request, a "reasonableness" qualification may be more onerous for the landlord than it would first appear. Generally, if the landlord must be "reasonable" in deciding whether to consent to an assignment or subletting, he may consider only whether the proposed assignee or subtenant is financially responsible, whether his business is suitable for the leased premises, and whether the proposed use would violate any law, regulation or covenant. The landlord cannot be guided by personal taste or convenience. It has been held to be "unreasonable" for the landlord to withhold consent because the assignee or subtenant refuses to agree to an increase in rent or make other payments, would compete with the landlord's business, or would have less sales volume and thus pay less percentage rent than did the tenant. 38

Forfeiture

In Barnett v. Dooley, 39 an unlawful detainer action, the supreme court held that a tenant's failure to pay rent or other default does not permit the landlord to terminate the tenancy in the absence of a provision in the lease allowing such a termination. 40 On the other hand, the RLTA gives the landlord the right to terminate the lease on default.41 Absent RLTA coverage, however, a landlord's lawyer must see that the lease contains a clause like this one:

Upon default, the landlord may terminate this lease.

Failure to include such a clause, like failure to provide for re-entry on default, may keep the landlord from ridding himself of a tenant that will neither perform his obligations nor surrender the premises, and leave the landlord with what will probably be an uncollectible judgment for rent or damages as his only remedy.42

Even with the above termination clause, a landlord may sometimes inadvertently bar himself from ending a tenancy upon his tenant's default. In Wood v. Forest Hill Cemetery, Inc.43 the supreme court held that if a landlord expresses or implies that he recognizes the continuance of the tenancy after he acquires knowledge of a default for which he can terminate the lease, he waives the right to invoke the forfeiture. Hence, at common law the acceptance of rent accruing after the occurrence of a cause for forfeiture may constitute a waiver of the breach. The RLTA also adopts this rule. 44

Authority exists that a default is not waived if the landlord receives rent with the express understanding that its acceptance will not constitute a waiver. In Barrasso v. Tennessee Brewing Co. 45 the court of civil appeals held that the landlord did not lose his right to terminate the lease for his tavern-keeper tenant's default in not selling the landlord's brand of beer because the landlord accepted rent with the express understanding that the default was not thereby waived. 46 Despite Barrasso, a landlord's lawyer should insert the following clause in the lease to protect his client if he should later fail to place such a condition on his acceptance of rent:

The acceptance of rent by the landlord shall not be deemed a waiver of the tenant's breach of any obligation hereunder (other than the failure to pay the rent accepted) or of the landlord's right to terminate this lease because of such breach. The waiver of the breach of a covenant or condition by the landlord shall not constitute a waiver of any other breach regardless of knowledge thereof.

Condemnation Awards

Condemnation of property encumbered by a lease ends the lease with respect to that property, and in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary, the tenant may recover from the condemnor for the part of his term cut off by the taking. The proper compensation for the tenant's lost term is the present or discounted value of the amount by which the rental value of the condemned premises for the balance of the term exceeds the fixed rent for that period.47

In Moultan v. George,48 the supreme court held that the compensation for a condemned tract of land cannot exceed the value of the unencumbered fee and that therefore the tenant's compensation for his lost term is not in addition to, but part of, the award for the value of the property taken. 49 As many landlords have learned to their dismay, the tenant's award has priority over the landlord's.50 In fact, in the case of a lease with many years remaining at a rent substantially below the market rate, the compensation for the tenant's lost term can absorb a large part of the overall award for the taking.51

The basis for a tenant's claim for his lost term is that his lease has ended because of condemnation. Thus, if the lease ends according to its own provisions prior to the vesting of title in the condemnor, it is not the taking that terminates the lease, the tenant loses nothing because of the condemnation itself, and the tenant will not be compensated for his lost term.52
In the case of a partial taking by eminent domain, a tenant may be compensated for more than the value of his lost term. There is no Tennessee authority in point, but the rule recognized in a majority of jurisdictions is that, in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary, a partial taking does not cause an abatement in rent. The tenant must pay the full rent for the balance of the term, but he is compensated from the total award by an amount equal to the discounted value of the excess rent he will pay in the future. Once again, this award has priority over and, in the case of a long-term lease, could reduce materially the landlord's share. The landlord could, to his surprise, be left with little but a claim for rent due in the future with the attendant risk of its not being collectible.53

From the tenant's point of view it is best for the lease not to deal with condemnation awards at all because if it does not he is sure to be compensated for any loss he sustains.54 The landlord, on the other hand, must insist on having a clause dealing with condemnation awards in order to avoid having his compensation materially reduced or totally absorbed by that of the tenant. The following language will insure that the landlord gets what he usually expects - the entire sum awarded for the value of the property taken:

The entire award for any taking of the leased premises, whether such taking be in whole or in part, shall belong to the landlord.

A more subtle, but equally effective way for the landlord's lawyer to achieve the same result is to use these two clauses:

If the leased premises are condemned for public use or if such a portion is condemned so as to prevent the tenant from using the leased premises in substantially the same manner as theretofore used, this lease will terminate on the day prior to the vesting of title in the condemning authority. If a portion of the leased premises is taken or condemned, and if such taking does not prevent the tenant from using the leased premises in substantially the same manner as theretofore used, then this lease shall terminate as to the portion of the leased premises taken on the day prior to the vesting of title in the condemning authority, but shall continue in effect as to the portion of the leased premises not taken. After the date the tenant surrenders possession of the portion taken, the rent payable hereunder will be reduced in proportion to the decrease in the fair rental value of the leased premises.

If the landlord's lawyer uses these two clauses (i) the tenant will not have a claim for the value of his lost term because an express lease provision, rather than the act of condemnation, will end that term; and (ii) in the case of a partial taking that does not end the lease, the tenant will not have the "excess rent" claim discussed in the previous paragraph because, by express provision, rent will abate after such a taking.

Rent

The rent clause is one of the briefest provisions in a lease, but one that requires careful drafting if the landlord's expectations are to be fulfilled. For example, it seems logical that, in the absence of stipulation in the lease, the tenant should send his rent to the landlord at the landlord's address. There is no Tennessee case law in point, but the general rule in other jurisdictions is that, in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary, rent is payable at the leased premises. The landlord, therefore, must go to the tenant to get paid.55 The RLTA expressly adopts the general rule with respect to residential rental property in affected counties.56

Moreover, the supreme court held in Arnold v. Lemond 57 that when a lease allows the landlord to terminate for non-payment of rent, unless demand is

 ". . . the landlord must demand the rent at the leased premises on the day it is due before he may exercise his right to terminate."

waived in the lease, the landlord must demand the rent at the leased premises on the day it is due before he may exercise his right to terminate.58 If the landlord fails to make demand he is deemed to have waived this cause for forfeiture.

Finally, the supreme court held in Gibbs v. Ross59 that unless the lease states that rent is payable in advance, rent is payable at the end of each periodic rental period. Thus, as a general rule, in the absence of lease language to the contrary, monthly rent is not payable until the end of each month and annual rent is not payable until the end of each year. In Gibbs a tenant that purchased the leased premises before the end of the lease's one-year term was successful in resisting the landlord's claim for rent for the period prior to the purchase. 60 The court stated that rent was not due until the end of the  term and that the right to rent when due passed with the reversion.61 Under the RLTA, however, the presumption that rent is not due until the end of the term has been reversed, and thus, in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary, rent of residential tenants in affected counties is payable in advance. 62

For economic, convenience, and security reasons, no landlord wants to go to his tenant for payment, or demand past due rent at the leased premises, or collect rent in arrears. To make sure that the landlord will not be required to do any of these things, the landlord's lawyer should make clear in the lease when and where the rent is payable and that it is payable without demand:

Rent will be paid in advance, on or before the first day of each month [year], without demand, at the address set forth herein.

Conclusion

Both the landlord and the tenant may encounter unforeseen problems if a lease addresses inadequately the areas discussed above. Unless the lease requires the landlord to make repairs, the tenant may not be able to demand that the landlord do so. Unless the lease permits the tenant to cancel upon destruction, he may have to continue to pay rent after fire destroys the leased premises. Unless the lease provides that holding over will create only a month to month tenancy, a tenant may be required to pay rent for a renewal term of up to one year if he holds over. On the other hand, the landlord may be deprived of valuable rights unless the lease permits him to re-enter the leased premises, terminate the lease upon the tenant's default, prohibit an assignment or subletting, collect the full condemnation award for the value of property taken, and collect rent in advance and without going to the tenant and demanding it.

Fortunately, careful draftsmanship can eliminate the surprises that failure to deal with these areas can cause. In fact, a lawyer need use only simple lease clauses - clauses that often pass for boilerplate - to insure that his client enjoys the rights he anticipates and avoids burdens he does not expect.

Footnotes
  1. 142 Tenn. 670, 674, 222 S.W. 528, 529 (1919).
  2. Accord, Evco Corp. v. Ross, 528 S.W. 2d 20, 23 (Tenn 1975); Gooch-Edenton Hardware Co. v. Long, 17 Tenn. App. 581, 587 (1933).
  3. 142 Tenn. at 673-74,222 S.W. at 529.
  4. Id. at 673, 222 S.W. at 529.
  5. Id. at 671-74, 222 S.W. at 528-529.
  6. 183 Tenn. 413, 192 S.W.2d 987 (1946).
  7. Id. at 415, 192 S.W.2d at 988.
  8. Id. at 423-24,192S.W.2dat991; accord, Roberts v. Tennessee Wesleyan College, 60 Tenn. App. 624, 633, 450 S.W.2d 21, 25 (1969); Buggs v. Memphis Housing Authority, 60 Tenn. App. 668, 672, 450 S.W.2d 596, 598 (1969). See also, Noel, Landlord's Tort Liability in Tennessee, 30 Tenn. L. Rev. 368, 369 (1963).
  9. T.C.A. §§ 66-28-101 to -516 (1982).
  10. T.C.A. § 66-28-102(a) (1982).
  11. T.C.A. § 66-28-304(2) (1982); see Note, An Overview of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 7 Memph. St. L. Rev. 109 (1977).
  12. 12 Tenn. App. 286 (1933).
  13. See also Eveo Corp. v. Ross, 528 S.W.2d 20, 23-24 (Tenn. 1975).
  14. See Case Note, 28 Tenn. L. Rev 286 (1961).
  15. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant §§ 922-23 (1970).
  16. See Id.
  17. T.C.A. 66-28-506 (1982).
  18. See Post v. Brown, 142 Tenn. 304, 207, 218 S.W. 823, 824 (1919).
  19. 11 Tenn. App. 366 (1930).
  20. Id. at 370.
  21. T.C.A. §§ 66-28-503 (1982).
  22. 2 Tenn. 233 (1814).
  23. 2 Tenn. at 233-234; accord, Walgreen Co. v. Walton, 16 Tenn. App. 213,229,64 S.W.2d 44,53 (1932).
  24. T.C.A. §§ 66-28-403, -505 (1982).
  25. 2 Tenn. at 233-234.
  26. See Greene v. Donnell, I I Tenn. App. 366, 370 (1930).
  27. 41 Tenn. 354 (1860).
  28. 41 Tenn. at 355.
  29. Id. at 356; accord, Campbell v. American Limestone Co., 109 F. Supp. 741, 747 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Lewis v. Bringhurst Reid Co., 155 Tenn. 177, 290 S.W. 972 (1926); Wilson v. Alexander, 115 Tenn. 125, 88 S.W. 935 (I 905).
  30. 29 Tenn. App. 31, 37, 193 S.W. 2d 100, 102 (1945).
  31. See Id.
  32. 185 Tenn. 369, 372-74, 206 S.W.2d 388, 389-390 (1947).
  33. 183 Tenn. 413, 420-21, 192 S.W.2d 987, 990 (1946).
  34. I M. Friedman, Friedman on Leases 7.303 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
  35. Id. §§ 7.303b, 7.303cl, and 7.303d.
  36. Id.
  37. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 422 (1970).
  38. See I Friedman § 7.304c.
  39. 186 Tenn. 611, 212 S.W. 2d 598 (1947).
  40. 186 Tenn. at 615, 212 S.W.2d at 600.
  41. T.C.A. § 66-28-510 (1982).
  42. See note 26 supra. See generally 40 Am. Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant § 1020 (1970).
  43. 183 Tenn. 413, 422, 192 S.W.2d 487, 490 (1946).
  44. T.C.A. § 66-28-508 (1982).
  45. 1 Tenn. Civ. App. 662 (191 1).
  46. See also Neubert v. Messer, 15 Tenn. App. 210, 217 (1932).
  47. 11 Friedman § 13.3.
  48. 208 Tenn. 586, 348 S.W. 2d 129 (1961).
  49. 208 Tenn. at 589-91, 348 S.W. 2d at 130-3 1; accord, State v. Gee, 565 S.W.2d 498, 501-02 (Tenn. App. 1977).
  50. 11 Friedman § 13.3
  51. Id.
  52. Id.
  53. Id. § 13.201.
  54. Id. § 13.5.
  55. 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 543 (1968).
  56. T.C.A. § 66-28-201 (1982).
  57. 192 Tenn. 366, 241 S.W.2d 430 (1951).
  58. 192 Tenn. at 369, 241 S.W.2d at 432.
  59. 39 Tenn. 437 (1859).
  60. 39 Tenn. at 440.
  61. Id.
  62. T.C.A. § 66-28-201(c) (1982).
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